Transcript
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Hi, I'm Nick Bergam, solutions engineer at Teleport.
Today my talk is going to be on zero trust,
particularly zero trust accessing and why we should consider implementation.
You we'll also be taking a look at how traditional
accessing solutions stack up against this framework. And at the
end, I'll give some recommendations for implementation of zero
trust access in your own infrastructure.
So, intros aside, let's get started.
If you've ever worked in information security or has some
colleagues in the field, you'll understand pretty intimately that
the field is constantly evolving in order to keep up with technology and modern
threats. With the introduction of cloud native technologies,
a new frontier is opening up before us, and the access threats to
this environment are very real and very much a challenge for
professionals. This challenge seems daunting.
You're not alone. The United States Army's
CIO Raj Eir attributed the inconsistent
application of configurations and architecture for cloud security
has one of the biggest concerns during an interview he gave back
in October, this is why government organizations
such as NASA, NSA, and DoD
are making this transition to zero trust frameworks a real priority.
So to paint a clear picture of what
zero trust is, why we need to actually
implement it, it's more important to see
first where we came from, and that is perimeter security.
For the past 30 years or so, this model has dominated
security architecture design. Local area
networks and wide area networks were created using partial
trust philosophy or us versus them,
and like investing heavily in strong walls and
other fortifications to keep out intruders,
the idea behind this was to create a moat that insulates
your interior network from the dangers beyond your defenses.
Vpns were forged during this era and were
first developed by Microsoft back in the late 1990s
using point to point tunneling protocols. While first
used for tunneling information between one trusted network to another,
the application and use of this technology has become much more broad in scope
and has been really stretched by security organizations.
This is due in part to the increased remote working
environments as well as the rise of cloud infrastructure.
But this perimeter security model and the technologies associated,
such as VPN, pose a significant challenge
for remote and cloud computing. For instance,
how do we know that the person trying to gain access
through our walls or defenses are who they say they are?
And how do we know that once they make it past our castle walls or
we admit them in, they're not going to run amok in our infrastructure?
Well, that's precisely the question that Forrester Research
group out of Cambridge, Massachusetts challenged when they submitted the
zero trust security model to the public domain this
framework was outlined in response to the NIST's request
for feedback on a document called developing a framework
to improve critical infrastructure cybersecurity.
What Forrester said in this research paper is look,
our whole approach to security is a misconception and
our current trust models are broken. We trust first everything
that is already on our network, and we need to be looking at
security, assuming that the bears and other dangerous animals
are already beyond our castle defenses and
running around in our infrastructure. They united in
their report that more than half the breaches they surveyed could,
at least in part, be attributed to internal actors in
the form of either theft or loss of corporate assets or
the misuse of information by insiders and business
partners, either maliciously or inadvertently.
Here, a trust to verify approach does not
compensate for these types of intrusions because the threat
would come from what is already considered to be a trusted source.
So the focus of the zero trust model is
on strict identity verification for each person,
bot, service or device trying to access
resources on the private network, regardless of
where they're sitting, either inside or outside of those defenses on
your perimeter. By imposing these strict authentication
requirements, we are able to better enforce the
principle of least privilege. Another comes pillar of zero trust.
This framework also calls for the inspection and logging of
all network traffic. Each of these fundamental requirements
must be applied to every level of the OSI model as well
to limit lateral movement across your infrastructure as
much has possible. So legacy access
technologies such as traditional vpns were
never designed, or they're definitely not equipped to
take on these responsibilities. While encrypted
tunnels and access through encrypted tunnels used
to be synonymous with security, this is no longer the case.
So the first challenge that zerotrust takes on is
this over reliance on the security perimeter and
the technologies associated, such as vpns.
Vpns were never designed, first off, for continuous use.
With the massive shift happening to a remote or hybrid workforce,
existing VPN structures were forced to support
a continuous workload that it wasn't intended for, and this
creates an environment where the VPN servers are subject to excessive
loads that often negatively impact performance
and user experience. Today, we've all
come to expect high levels of availability and
quality, especially when it comes to interruptions
that can kill efficiency.
Inconsistency or latency at peak hours can be especially frustrating
as a result, and it makes little sense to direct all your network traffic
onto your corporate infrastructure via VPN,
only to transfer it from there onto the cloud.
Further, VPN's most glaring fault is
their authentication and authorization and audit are nonexistent.
When coupled with other security tools, you do have
these requirements of zero trust fulfilled,
but you end up spending more resources on more
software, adding more overhead,
and ultimately adding more to your configuration burden.
Finally, the criminal organizations that are
targeting remote workers are doing so more frequently,
and new security challenges present themselves that
traditional work accessing solutions weren't designed to solve.
The common vulnerabilities and exposure system lists
all the known vulnerabilities and exposures,
obviously, but at the time of this recording,
there are over 560 that could be attributed to VPN
vulnerabilities in the technology itself.
VPNs are totally blind also to content level
attacks, so it doesn't know if it's being
used to upload ransomware into a corporate
environment or a cloud infrastructure. It also doesn't know
if it's being used to siphon information out of these resources.
So a better approach is to have strong authentication,
authorization, and audit within your network defenses.
Continuous authentication is perhaps the most important piece of this
zero trust puzzle, and it's no secret
by now that a single sign on is critical to
today's cloud infrastructure. But also having a strong
IDP and MFA is imperative to ensuring that you
do have identity controls in place when authenticating
access. This is arguably the most
important piece of zero trust because authorization and
audit are reliant on this control being solved and
constantly applied at the lowest level of the OSI model.
Principle of least privilege is at the heart of authorization,
and being able to further divide access
by roles or attributes is needed in today's
cloud native environment. For obvious reasons,
the practice of provisioning access by roles
is widely implemented in some form already,
and it's important to prevent users from amassing too broader privileges.
Now I love me some ancient history,
so one of my favorite stories is that of Cincinnati's
who, as you might have guessed, is the namesake of Cincinnati,
Ohio, among other things. So the story comes that
when the Roman Empire was being threatened,
Cincinnatius was approached by the Senate and granted
powers of a dictator in order to guide
the empire through the crisis. Once he successfully did
so, he ceded those powers back to the Senate
and returned to the farm where he came from.
So just in time access is the fundamental security
practice where the privilege granted to access applications
or systems is limited to a predetermined period of
time, and also on a per need
basis. This helps to minimize the
risk of scanning privileges that attackers or malicious insiders
can readily exploit. Zero trust relies
heavily on the ability to see what's happening within your environments
at all times so alerting mechanisms such as Sim
tools directly enable this has long as there are
strong identities that cloud be used to
attribute entities to each action. For example,
knowing who sshed into a server as the root user
when executing a command, or knowing who
deleted or altered a table within a database has the
admin user provide that transparency needed
for a healthy cloud infrastructure. The next
challenge that zero trust takes on is that of shared
secrets, primarily secret
keys and passwords. So one
of the keys to securing your infrastructure is well eliminating
keys. Shared secrets have become
the natural progression to cope with requirements for
complicated passwords, tokens and secret keys.
Besides the obvious threat of brute force attacks,
hackers can intercept and steal passwords
well become any breach is detected. If a
malicious actor previously exploited a vulnerability to
collect legitimate credentials, those credentials could still
be valid months, possibly after patching.
Many organizations also keep a repository of some
sort, which are landmines if discovered by the wrong
individuals. Additionally, the temptation to
circumvent proper security controls can be
strong at times of urgency and occur all too often.
One example would be sharing credentials with a team or business partners
who need access into urgent
environments or sharing them via slack
or teams. It cloud also happen via unencrypted mediums
in the worst case scenario, such as emails.
If the use of these repositories that I
mentioned earlier sounds familiar, it's because it
does rely on the same premise as perimeter security,
that a hardened wall in the form of an encrypted
vault can protect the soft interior of your environment.
And if you recall what over reliance on walls
for security leads to. Well, as you can imagine,
if you're a fan of Lord of the Rings, bad things can happen.
So for the use case for short lived
certificates is very strong. In this example, when used in
tandem with a strong identity control, they not only eliminate
both the overhead associated with shared secrets,
but also much of the security concerns associated with
exposure. For example, damage is limited by
the hard time to live restrictions on each
certificate, and the ability to escalate or
laterally shift using a certificate is greatly hindered
by these devices and service accounts
that may be compromised. They also provide the foundation
for security verification each time an access request
is made within your segmented network. The final
challenge that zerotrust takes on is the
challenge of too many restrictions. So as you start to
evolve as a security, you start to see maybe
there's a use case for risk avoidance. So odds
are you could secure your infrastructure by removing certain access
types altogether, a practice known as risk avoidance.
But while removing access types such as SSH
sounds great to a security professional.
You'll rarely meet an engineers who agrees in the
value added in that position. The value of
having a unified access plane in this example
allows you to pipe all your access to your
various cloud compute resources such as databases,
servers, kubernetes or applications through
a single choke point using a proxy or
gateway. Now this proxy is a great
place to attach any restrictions or requests
modifications to your SSO identities to
provide accountability for those who are performing
actions in your cloud environment. It also ensures that
you only allow SSo users who are
authenticated to pass through and onto your resources,
while at the same time associating their identity to
each of their requests. Each time
you are using generic logins such as admin
or root, you could tie this activity to
the users and groups that you created within your resources.
Ideally, it would integrate with your current infrastructure and improve
your user experience while allowing you to provide
detailed monitoring activity. There are a
couple solutions that, when used on their own or
in tandem with existing tools, make up a very
strong zero trust defense system.
And one of them, and probably the most well known implementations
of Zero Trust was Google's Beyond Corp initiative,
which has released back in 2014. So Google's goal
was to allow employees to work efficiently on any network
without the use of vpns when they created this. And today,
Google also offers the identity aware proxy solution,
which is similar to the access plane. It allows
for continuous authorization checks
against an identity aware proxy and is
relatively straightforward to set up and use when integrating with an all
GCP cloud stack. Now, there are some
cloud agnostic and open resources tools designed
to tackle this problem as well, such as teleport. So yes,
we made it this far in the talk. It's time to talk a little bit
about teleport. Teleport goes deep into
the OSI model to provide you authentication,
authorization and audit, and it provides
that amongst all your cloud resources at the networking layer,
teleport also uses short lived certificates and
best of all, it's open source. So if you are interested
in exploring some more about how teleport can provision across
your infrastructure, I encourage you to have a look at
our open source community and GitHub, and we also
have some resources available on our website,
teleport.com. I hope that
this talk empowers you to take some of the practices we covered
today and implement them in your own cloud environment.
The transition to zero trust framework is undeniably a
challenge that is rarely a one size fits all,
but I promise you that the investment is always going
to be worth the trouble. Legacy technologies like vpns
and other perimeter access tools are quickly being replaced
with increasingly agile tools to fit the cloud native
environment. The benefits you'll see once you
move over to a zero trust approach are truly worth it,
and being able to reduce your attack surface from the inside threats
is something that every company grapples with. Secure access planes
that enforce strong identity requirements for access are
a win win here, because not only do they improve your
infrastructure and update it from legacy equipment, but also by
doing so, you'll find an increase in user experience and
efficiency. That's all I have today. Thanks again
for tuning in, and I hope that you cloud apply some of these lessons to
your organization.